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BUILDING a DECISION AID
RIGHT-SIDE OUT
Barry F. Anderson
Department of Psychology
Portland State University

The Thesis
• Decision aids are human-machine systems that, ideally,
(a) represent rationally the underlying logic of the
problem, AND
(b) take into account the bounded rationality and the
irrationality of the user’s mind.
• Decision aids that have been around the longest were
built by professionals, for professionals. They represent
the underlying logic of the problem well but are not
widely used.
• Some aids have been developed recently for the popular
market but don’t score well on either criterion. Wise
Decider is being developed with both criteria in mind.

• People often make important
decisions badly.
• Some of the simplest features of
decision analysis can improve
decisions.
• People rarely use decision analysis.
• Why, and what can be done?

Some of the Simplest
Features of Decision Analysis
Can Improve Decisions

Even low-tech decision analysis…
•
•
•
•

Provides external memory
Compares alternatives
Considers outcomes
Analyzes outcomes into attributes
(decision tables)
• Analyzes outcomes into futures
(decision trees)
• Separates facts from values

DA Provides External Memory I
For example, Japanese outperform other
cultures in calculation by using or
thinking in terms of abacuses.

Hatano, G. (1982). Learning to add and subtract: A Japanese
perspective. In T. P. Carpenter, J. Moser, M., & T. A. Romberg
(Eds.), Addition and Subtraction: A cognitive perspective. Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. P. 217.

DA Provides External Memory II
• A priori decomposition. Decision analysis analyzes the
problem into simpler components prior to judgment and
then combines the analytic judgments mathematically.
• A posteriori decomposition. Statistical (bootstrap)
models analyze, after the fact, judgments made
holistically.
• Even a posteriori models outperform the decision
makers on whose judgments those models are based,
by providing external memory and removing the
randomness from those judgments, thus “raising the
decision makers by their own bootstraps.”
Dawes, R. M. (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision
making. American Psychologist, 34, 571-582.

DA Provides External Memory III

Reisberg, D. (1996). The non-ambiguity of mental images. In C.
Cornold, R. Logie, M. Brandimonte, G. Kaufman, & D. Reisberg (Eds.),
Stretching the Imagination: Representation and transformation in mental
imagery. NY: Oxford U. Press.

DA Requires Comparison of
Alternatives I
Without comparison:
A 7/36 chance to win $9 is rated 9.4.
A 7/36 chance to win $9 and a 29/37
chance to lose 5 cents is rated 14.4.
Slovic, P. (1985). Violations of dominance in rated attractiveness of playing
bets. Decision Research Report 85-6. Eugene, OR: Decision Research.

DA Requires Comparison of
Alternatives II
When a single case is evaluated, judgments
of a rape victim’s responsibility are higher
for a virgin than for a divorcee.
Birnbaum, M. (1982). Controversies in psychological measurement. In B. Wegener
(Ed.), Social Attitudes and Psychological Measurement. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pp. 401-485.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.
Hsee, C. K. (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation of preference reversals
between joint and separate evaluation of alternatives. Organizational Behavior &
Human Decision Processes, 46, 247-257.

DA Requires Comparison of
Alternatives III
We tend to “throw good money after bad”,
favoring alternatives for which we have
already incurred substantial costs, even
though these costs were incurred in the
past and are thus necessarily the same
for all alternatives.

DA Considers Outcomes
Pass

Fail

Buy vacation 54%

57%

Don’t
Know
32%

Not Buy
Vacation
Pay $5 to
decide later

16%

12%

7%

30%

31%

61%

Tversky, A., & Shafir, E. (1992). The disjunction effect in choice under
uncertainty. Psychological Science, 3, 305-309.

DA Analyzes Outcomes
into Attributes I
HOLISTIC vs. DECOMPOSED JUDGMENT

Holistic-Decomposed
Correlation
Correlation Coefficient

von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986, p. 364
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von Winterfeldt, D., & Edwards, W. (1986). Decision
Analysis and Behavioral Research. Cambridge:
Cambridge U. Press. P. 364

DA Analyzes Outcomes
into Attributes II

Gardner, P. & Edwards, W. (1975). Multiattribute utility measurement for social decision making. In M.
F. Kaplan & S. Schwarz (Eds.), In M. F. Kaplan & S. Schwarz (Eds). Human Judgment and
Decision Processes. NY: Academic Press.

DA Analyzes Outcomes into
Possible Futures (Correctly)
Superadditivity. Probabilities at an event
node sum from slightly over 1.00 for 2
events to around 3.00 for 16 events.
Explanation. Events not in attention seem
to be underweighted. “Other” underweighted
in fault tree.

DA Separates Facts from Values
(& permits distributed decision making)

Hammond, K. R., & Adelman, L. (1976). Science, values, and human
judgment. Science, 194, 389-396.

Conclusion
• The greatest net benefit may come from simple
changes that represent more rationally the
underlying logic of the problem without
becoming so complex as to lose touch with the
bounded rationality and the irrationality of the
user’s mind.
• Overall Quality = Verisimilitude X Useability
“Better the half than the whole.”
- Chinese proverb.

People often make important
decisions badly.
Some of the simplest features of
decision analysis can improve
decisions.
• People rarely use decision analysis.
• Why, and what can be done?

People Rarely Use
Decision Analysis

Resistance to
Bootstrap Models
•Over 50 years of demonstrations of the superiority of
bootstrap models to the judges they model have had almost
no effect on the practice of human judgment! Why?
•Models threaten egos and pocketbooks.
•Models are less politically impressive.
•Statistical evaluation reveals error, while intuitive evaluation
conceals error.
Dawes, R. M. (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in
decision making. American Psychologist, 34, 571-582.

Resistance to
Checklists in Medicine
In 2001, Peter Pronovost, an M. D. at
Johns Hopkins, introduced a checklist for
reducing infections when putting a line
into a patient. In the first two years of
using the checklist, the 10-day line
infection rate went from 11% to 0%; the
number of deaths dropped by 8; and the
costs dropped by $2,000,000.
Gawande, A. (2007). The Checklist. The New Yorker.
Dec. 10. Pp. 87-95.

Pronovost also introduced a checklist for
caring for patients on mechanical
ventilation. In the first year, the
percentage of patients who failed to
receive the recommended care dropped
from 70% to 4%; the occurrence of
pneumonia fell by 25%; and 21 fewer
patients died.
In the state of Michigan, a checklist saved
1500 lives and $75,000,000 in the first 18
months.

What was the reception?
•There were few additional takers.
•Some physicians were offended.
•Some doubted the evidence.
•Some said, “Forget the paperwork. Take
care of the patient.”

Resistance Among
Decision Scientists
“What do you do for a living?”
“Study decision making.”
“Then you can help me. I have some
big decisions to make.”
“Well, actually....”
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein. S. (1977). Behavioral decision
theory. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 28, 1-39.

Resistance
at NSF and NIH
The National Science Foundation and the
National Institutes of Health refused to use
decomposed ratings for reviewing their
proposals, although the changes were
• Recommended by a leading decision
researcher,
• Well supported by research, and
• Simple to implement.

Arkes, H. R. (2003). The nonuse of psychological research at two federal
agencies. Psychological Science, 14, 1-6.

The responses?
“We don’t want any criteria.”
“[This suggestion] causes less
agreement and consensus than we
would like around here.”
“No psychologist is going to tell
me how to evaluate proposals.”

A Personal Experience of
Resistance Among Instructors
• Editors loved The
Three Secrets.
• BUT marketing
departments
couldn’t find enough
courses to justify
financially the
decision to publish.

A Resource-Allocation
Perspective
The National Institutes of Health has a
budget of $30,000,000,000 a year to fund
medical discoveries.
Yet work on using checklists in medicine
has already saved more lives than that of

any medical discovery in the past decade.
Research on putting knowledge about
decision making into practice should be
similarly cost-effective.

People often make important
decisions badly.
Some of the simplest features of
decision analysis can improve
decisions.
People rarely use decision analysis.
• Why, and what can be done?

Why and What Can Be Done?

Diagnosis of Causes of Problem

Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis

32

Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis

33

Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis

34

Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis

35

Examples of
Behavioral Reasons
•Not thinking to use DA
•Insufficient skills to implement DA
•Insufficient motivation to implement DA.
•Insufficient authority to implement DA

Examples of
Rational Reasons
•Diagnosticity. “It’s not likely to make any
difference.” (overconfidence)
•Value of information. “The difference it
makes isn’t likely to justify the costs.”
•Political externalities. “An improved
decision would incur political costs.”
•Personal externalities. “An improved
decision would incur personal costs.”

Enhanced Benefits Not Likely
to Be Seen as Justifying
Increased Costs to the DMer
Subjects with a decision aid did not use
more information than subjects without
one. Effort is weighted more than
accuracy, probably because feedback on
effort is both more immediate and more
tangible.
Todd, P. & Benbasat, I. (1992). The use of information in decision making: Investigation of the impact
of computer-based decision aids. MIS Quarterly, September.

Examples of
Intuitive Reasons
•Cognitive position bias. “The answer
is perfectly clear without any DA.”
(E.g., availability, similarity.)
•Decision style bias. “That’s not the
way I like to think about decisions.
It’s difficult for me to have confidence
in the results.” (E.g., discussion,
stories, reasons, images.)

Examples of
Irrational Reasons
•Motivated position bias. “There’s no
way I’m going to put my favored
alternative at risk.”
•Motivated process bias. “There’s no
way I’m going to yield any control over
the decision process.”

Decision Training
May Not Be the Answer

Decision Training
May Not Be Very Effective
• High school students often can’t deal
effectively with problems requiring abstract
thinking. Renner, J. W., & & Stafford, D. G. (1972). Teaching
Science in the Secondary School. NY: Harper & Row.

• As many as 50% of incoming college
students operate below Piaget’s level of
formal operations. Gray, R. L. (1979). Toward observing
that which is not directly observable. In J. Lochhead & J. Clement (Eds.),
Cognitive Process Instruction. Philadelphia: Franklin Instit. Press. Pp. 217228.

GOFER
The Most Herculean Attempt Yet
to Teach Decision Making
•

•
•

•

Goals clarification,
Option generation,
Fact finding,
Consideration of Effects,
Review & Implementation
40-50 contact hours spaced over at least 1 year
Basic Principles of Decision Making, Decision Making
in Practice, 2 student workbooks, and a teachers’
manual
Two-four-day workshops sponsored by State Education
Departments in Australia.
Mann, L., Harmoni, R., & Power, C. (1991). The GOFER course in decision making. In J. Baron & R. V. Brown,
Eds. Teaching Decision Making to Adolescents. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Pp. 61-78

Evaluation of GOFER
• Improved confidence in decision making.
• Improved verbal knowledge of the course
material.
• Yet no difference on any of the G, O, F, E,
or R steps in decision making.
Beyth-Marom, R., & Fischhoff, B. (1991). Teaching decision making to adolescents: A critical review. In J.
Baron & R. V. Brown, Eds. Teaching Decision Making to Adolescents. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Pp. 34.

Independence of Verbal Knowledge
and Performance
In four tasks and two studies, practice improved only utilization of the
correct rule, and explanation improved only the ability to articulate
the correct rule.
• Study 1. Maximize sugar production by changing number of
workers; achieve a target social response by changing social
behavior.
Berry, D. C., & Broadbent, D. E. (1984). On the relationship between task performance and
associated verbalizable knowledge. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 36A, 209-291.

• Study 2. Maximize bus riders by changing spacing between buses
and parking fees; achieve a target social response by changing
social behavior; determine optimal level of taxation conditional on
level of employment and inflation.
Broadbent, D. E., Fitzgerald, P., & Broadbent, M. H. P. (1986) Implicity and explicit knowledge in
the control of complex systems. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 33-50.

Decision Aids
May Be the Answer
“The unassisted hand and the
understanding left to itself possess but
little power. Effects are produced by the
means of instruments and helps, which the
understanding requires no less than the
hand….”
Sir Francis Bacon
Novum Organum, 1620,
First Book, Aphorism 2

An Overview of Three Decision
Aids
•Expert Choice (sound)
•Let Simon Decide (appealing)
•Wise Decider (sound & appealing)

Expert Choice’s Opening Screen

Let Simon Decide’s Opening Screen

Wise D’s Opening Screen
Well, hello!
You must have a
decision to make.

EC’s First Page

EC’s Second Page

LSD’s First Page

LSD’s Second Page

WD’s First Page

WD’s Second Page

EC’s Results I

EC’s Results II

EC’s Results III

LSD’s Results

WD’s Results
In the future:
Commensurated table colors

1. One-sentence justification
2. Uncertainties to monitor

A Closer Look at Wise Decider

Behavioral

•Forget to (S)
Cup, spell checker, voice recognition
•Forget how to (R)
Guides, embedded training
•Not motivated (+)
Response counters, social reinforcement

Rational

•Decision Path
•Documentation

Irrational

•Discussion, warning signs
•Externalization
•Observer perspective
•Process orientation
•Testability
•Publicity test
•Completeness & dominance tests

Intuitive

•Advisors
•Intuitive start
•Colors & Moveable rows and columns
•Instructions in external memory
•Instructions in small steps
•Completeness & dominance checks
•[Hidden math model]
•Intuitive check & justification

Three Approaches to Uncertainty

• Expert Choice
• Let Simon Decide
• Wise Decider

Expert Choice’s
Treatment of Uncertainty

Let Simon Decide’s
Treatment of Uncertainty

WD’s Treatment of Uncertainty

Identifying & Representing
Uncertainty I
• Identifying uncertainty. Which alternative
is the riskiest? Which estimates of impact
are the least certain? If this decision turns
out badly, what’s the most likely reason it
will have turned out badly?

Identifying & Representing
Uncertainty IIa
•

•

•

For any cell where there is significant uncertainty, enter a range of values rather than
a single value. For example, instead of entering a salary of $50,000 when you aren't
at all certain that that will be the salary, you might enter the range $40,000$60,000. Make the range broad enough that you feel there's a 99% chance that the
actual value will turn out to be between the high and low ends of your range. A
common human failing is to be overconfident in making predictions and to set ranges
of uncertainty that are too narrow.
For any cell where there is significant uncertainty, enter a range of values rather than
a single value. For example, instead of entering a salary of $50,000 when you aren't
at all certain that that will be the salary, you might enter the range $40,000$60,000. Make the range broad enough that you feel there's a 99% chance that the
actual value will turn out to be between the high and low ends of your range.
We’re really not very good at judging probabilities. For one thing, we tend to think the
future will be much like the past and, as a consequence, often encounter surprises
that we haven’t adequately prepared for. For example, when we judge a 99%
confidence interval, only 1% of the cases should fall outside that interval; instead the
figure can approach 50% (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982). That’s a lot of surprises! This is
why Wise Decider emphasizes uncertainty proofing, which doesn’t require thinking
about probabilities. When you do have to think about probabilities, however, the
following guidelines can improve your judgments.

Identifying & Representing
Uncertainty IIb
•
•

•

•

•

Testability. Start with a testable, preferably quantitative, description of the outcome, e.g., “inches of rainfall in a
24-hour period”, rather than just “rain” (Spetzler & von Holstein, 1975).
Statistics. Start with objective statistics, when possible. For example, when thinking about how long a marriage
might survive, start with statistics for the general population. We tend to have more confidence than we should in
vivid examples about what we know about the particular case (here, the particular couple) than in abstract
statistics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), but we should resist this tendency, since the statistics are based on more
cases and are more reliable.
Adjustment. You can then adjust these statistics to take into account what you know about the case at hand, but
keep in mind that what you know about any particular case is rarely all that informative and rarely justifies much
adjustment. To correct the tendency to set ranges of uncertainty that are too narrow, push the upper and lower
limits out to where they feel uncomfortable. If you’re judging a 99% confidence interval for how long a marriage
will last, the low end of the range should usually be so low that you feel uncomfortable about it, and the high end of
the range should usually be so high that you feel uncomfortable about. It can help to try to think of specific causes
or scenarios that might result in an extremely high value and specific causes or scenarios that might result in an
extremely low value. (Fischhoff, 1982).
Frequencies. We think better in terms of frequencies, rather than percentages or probabilities (Gigerenzer,
1991). Imagine that you have an urn with 99 white balls and 1 black ball, and ask yourself, Is it more likely that the
event (e.g., the marriage ends after 6 months) will occur or that you’d draw a black ball from this urn? If it’s more
likely that the event will occur, Is it more likely that you’d draw a black ball from an urn with 50 white balls and 50
black balls? On the other hand, if it’s more likely that you’d draw a black ball from the original urn with 99 white
balls and 1 black ball, change the question to, Is it more likely that you’d draw a black ball from an urn with 999
white balls and 1 black balls. By asjusting up and down in this way, you should be able to arrive at an urn where
you’re unable to say whether it’s more likely that you’d draw a black ball from that urn or that the event would
occur.
The availability trap. We tend to judge events that are more available to memory as more probable (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979). Certainly, events that occur often are easier to remember, but so also are events that have
occurred recently or are vivid. People tend to be reluctant to fly shortly after an airlines hijacking, even though the
probability of a hijacking may actually be reduced for a time while people are more alert. When you’re judging a
probability, consider whether recent and/or vivid events might be biasing your judgment.

Identifying & Representing
Uncertainty III
• Coloring ranges. The color appropriate for an uncertain
cell will, of course, be between that for the best end of
the range and that for the worst end of the range.
Specifically, (a) if you're risk neutral, the color for an
uncertain cell will be the color appropriate for the longrun average value that would be expected if the decision
were to be repeated many times; OR (b) if you're risk
averse, as most people usually are, the color for the cell
will be a lower (darker) color than that. If, in the unlikely
case that you're risk prone, the color for the cell will be a
higher (lighter) color.

“Uncertainty Proofing”
•
•
•
•
•

Control
Get information
Wait for information
Diversify
Share risk

Adding Mathematics to
Wise Decider
• Problem structuring: Identification of
redundancy & irrelevance
• Choice: Identification of dominance
• Conflict resolution: Identification of winning
trades
• Uncertainty: Sensitivity analysis to guide
uncertainty proofing
• [Probability trees? (a) Identify positively
correlated uncertainties and mediating event,
(b) split row, (b) request probabilities?]
• Justification: Identification of sufficient reasons

